Revisiting a dark period in history
Shahid Alam goes back to the age of coups and counter-coups
Just how sensitive, fragile, and plainly dysfunctional Bangladesh's political culture has become down the years can be read into what the book under review has to say, and, probably more importantly, is unable, or unwilling, to say. Obviously, with it running into its fifth edition (reprint would probably be the right word) from the time it was first published in 1997, Bangladesh: Raktakto Audhaya 1975-81 has been a popular read, at least in the number of copies sold. However, whether it has been universally popular among the readers, given the deeply fractious nature of political opinion existing in the country, is open to question. On very politically sensitive issues writers and conference speakers prefer to steer a safe course, gingerly skirting around subject matters, for fear of offending one or the other major political party/inclination. Political intolerance of opposing views is, and has been, a reality in Bangladesh for some time now. At times such intolerance flares up into physical violence. Such is the sad state of pluralist democracy in this country. Sakhawat Hussain is also careful that he does not ruffle too many, if any, political feathers in Bangladesh: Raktakto Audhaya 1975-81, and lays down a fairly straightforward account of a slew of political assassinations that took place in the country between 1975 and 1981, beginning with Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and ending with Ziaur Rahman and the sequel to his killing. In fact, the author categorically blames political failures for the spate of murders carried out by military personnel. And makes this observation: that the armed forces are supposed to be under the control and direction of the country's political authority, and, whenever this situation fails to materialize, dictatorship is a likely outcome. One can hardly dispute either of the two remarks, if one believes in, and adheres to, the norms of liberal pluralist democracy. Hussain, however, to underscore the point that he chooses to play it safe with sensitive political issues, only goes so far as to state that he hopes his book will inspire future generations of writers to delve deeper and wider into the tragic events of those years to come up with their own analyses. Hussain, a former senior army officer, not surprisingly, dwells at length on the military officers, from junior to senior levels, who were involved one way or the other with the events. He singles out for praise the sacrifice of Brig. Gen. (posthumous) Jamil Ahmed for Bangabandhu on 15 August 1975, and Lt. Col. Ahsan and two other officers for Ziaur Rahman on 30 May 1981. As he says, these four splendidly exemplified the soldiers' code, "That I shall go wherever my superior orders me even at the peril of my life." The author is particularly harsh on the Jatiyo Rakhshi Bahini (JRB), which, as he accurately points out, was an irregularly-constituted political force under the inordinate influence of a mysterious Indian army Major Reddy, and was used primarily for gaining political ends. This created animosity among the armed forces, who were united on this one issue, in spite of their differences regarding freedom fighters and non-freedom fighters/repatriated military personnel, a situation that contributed to the tragic events of 15 August 1975. As Hussain notes, several of the officers involved were valiant decorated freedom fighters. JRB's activities, as he correctly observes, also served to make the Awami League (later BKSAL) government of the time unpopular with the general public, and to belittle Bangabandhu's image. Furthermore, JRB did not even offer an iota of resistance against the coup d'etat mounted by a few junior-level officers that profoundly changed the course of Bangladesh's political history, and gave rise to the political chasm that bedevils the country to this day. The author's account of Maj. Faruk Rahman's chutzpah in bringing JRB to its knees and total capitulation is interesting. Hussain takes to task then army chief Maj. Gen. K.M. Shafiullah for his indecisiveness and inaction, blaming his inexperience at taking senior command-level decisions to his rapid promotion up the ranks. He believes that the disarming and arrest of the handful of officers involved in the coup would probably have restored discipline in the armed forces, but acknowledges that the reaction to such action could not have been determined with absolute certainty. Certainly most of the Awami League leaders lost no time in falling behind the coup leaders or extending their allegiance to Khondoker Mushtaque Ahmed, the mastermind (and an Awami League front ranking leader to boot) behind Bangabandhu and his extended family's assassination. Except for a very few, none of them protested. The prominent ones who did were either subsequently executed or fled the country. From a military standpoint, Hussain stresses on maintaining the chain of command in the armed forces. Once that chain is broken, as was done in 1975, discipline, a cornerstone of the military, weakens, and, as happened on a number of occasions in post-1975, coups, counter-coups, and drive for state power ensue. Regarding the formation of BKSAL, Hussain wonders how Bangabandhu, a lifelong champion of pluralist democracy, could have adopted one-party rule for the country, and concludes, from hearsay, that, in this venture, he was decisively swayed by Sheikh Moni (who was also killed on 15 August). And, interestingly, (a harbinger of things to come and/or a clue to the complex mosaic that culminated in the coup?), Maj. Shariful Huq Dalim, a key leader, named Bangladesh as an Islamic Republic when he first announced the news of the coup over the radio, although it was not subsequently repeated. The author links the pre-1975 political failures to the legacy of blood that 15 August 1975 ushered in. And that legacy included a succession of coups and counter-coups that were less political in nature than a naked grab for state power. Eventually Ziaur Rahman, after having survived a number of attempts on his life by sections of the armed forces (which also cost a number of officers and enlisted personnel their lives, many through summary court-martials), was assassinated in Chittagong. The accusatory finger for the deed pointed to the GOC Chittagong, Maj. Gen. Manzur, like Zia a valiant freedom fighter, who was regarded in the army as a bright, intrepid and very intelligent officer, but who, in Hussain's judgment, became ambitious for state power. The author brings up a perplexing problem afflicting Bangladesh while discussing Manzur. When serving as the GOC Chittagong, he was, ex-officio, principal coordinator of civilian policies in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Apparently his policies were instrumental in settling Bengalis in various parts of CHT, especially Khagrachhari, Rangamati, and Bandarban. In some places, for protecting themselves, the resettled Bengalis were also provided with arms. Regarding Zia, Hussain comments on his personal honesty, and states that his example is rare among Third World heads of government/state. There are a number of reflective observations that enhance the book's intent. Citing the country's low political culture, he believes that the lower the level of political culture of a country, the more powerful a well-organized force like the military becomes, especially in a Third World country, like Bangladesh. He also thinks that the internal bickering in political parties, and the self-interest and high ambition of individual politicians have served as impediments to the development of a healthy political culture in this country. And, lest one forgets, that very same low political culture was instrumental in ushering in the emergency of 2007. History should not repeat itself. In the context of Col. Abu Taher, another counter-coup stalwart, Hussain observes that leftist politics has never struck a chord in the heart of the general populace of Bangladesh, and predicts that it almost certainly will not in the future. Regarding India's decisive help for the Bangladeshi cause during the Liberation War, Hussain brings up a matter-of-fact issue in international politics. He states that New Delhi was serving its own self-interest, because the break-up of Pakistan would weaken it, and it would cease to be a huge threat to its security. This ploy is well-known in international relations theory and practice as realpolitik, and is usually the driving force in inter-state relations. Notwithstanding the "safe" handling of sensitive political issues, and the inordinate number of spelling errors in the sparsely-used English-language sentences (one would have thought that, by the fifth edition --- really reprint --- they would have been rectified), Bangladesh: Raktakto Audhaya 1975-81 will offer the reader insights into the military's role during the coups and counter-coups that occurred in that period, and some homespun truths regarding the political culture of the country.
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