The Saudi–Emirati cold war and what it means for Bangladesh
On 1 May 2026, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) quit the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and OPEC+, and according to experts, it is planning to boost oil production by around 1 million barrels per day (BPD). The UAE, which is currently the 8th largest producer of oil and contains the 6th largest oil reserves in the world, insists that its decision was motivated by energy policy and not by political factors. However, the decision has widened its already growing rift with Saudi Arabia, which is currently the 3rd largest producer of oil and holds the 2nd largest oil reserves in the world. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are already engaged in proxy war against each other on several fronts, including Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia, and the energy rift has added a new dimension to the ‘cold war’ between the two influential Gulf Arab states.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE as Sub-imperial Powers
The rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE can be viewed as a conflict between two sub-imperial powers. According to Brazilian economist and sociologist Ruy Mauro Marini, when a state, which is not a global imperial power itself, pursues policies in accordance with the interests of imperial powers and acts in an imperial manner within its own region, the phenomenon is called ‘sub-imperialism.’ Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not global imperial powers. Both of the states have been under the security umbrella of the United States (US) – a global imperial power for decades, and both provided varying degrees of support to US policies in the Muslim World, particularly with regard to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Iraqi–Iranian War, the Persian Gulf War, the Yugoslav Wars, and the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Libya.
However, Saudi Arabia has been acting as a regional hegemon in and around the Middle East since its creation, illustrated by the Saudi–North Yemeni War (1934), the Saudi intervention in the North Yemeni Civil War (1962–1970), the bankrolling of the Syrian-led Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), the Saudi-led interventions in Bahrain (2011) and Yemen (2015–present), the Saudi-led blockade of Qatar (2017–2021), and the ‘kidnapping’ and forced resignation of the Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Saudi Arabia in 2017. On the other hand, the UAE, despite being smaller in terms of size, population, and resources, has been flexing its muscles around the region since the 2010s, demonstrated by its overt and/or covert interventions in Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia, its growing economic and military footprints across Africa, and its confrontations with Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Hence, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE are acting as sub-imperial powers within the same region.
From Concord to Conflict
Until the mid-2010s, Saudi–Emirati relations and interests appeared perfectly synchronized, with both having strongman and modernizing rulers in the persona of Muhammad bin Salman (MBS) and Muhammad bin Zayed (MBZ), shared opposition to political Islam, common oil interests, close ties with the US, and shared antipathy towards Shia-dominated Iran. They closely cooperated with each other in opposing the Arab Spring and on the issues of Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Qatar. However, by late 2010s, their policies began to diverge, as the UAE grew more confident, and disputes arose on a set of issues ranging from economic rivalry and oil policy tensions to views on political Islam and normalization with Israel.
In 2011, after the start of the Syrian Civil War, Saudi Arabia and the UAE started supporting the insurgent groups against the Iranian-backed Syrian government to counter Iranian influence in Syria. However, in 2018, the UAE normalized relations with the Syrian government, diverging from the Saudi policy. In 2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with a number of Arab and African states, intervened in Yemen to protect the Saudi-aligned Yemeni government from the Zaydi Shia-dominated Ansar Allah, popularly known as the Houthis. However, Saudi and Emirati strategic objectives diverged: Riyadh prioritized securing its border with Yemen through its stabilization, while Abu Dhabi sought to control strategic ports and maritime routes. Eventually, by 2019, the UAE started to draw down its support for the Saudi-led coalition, and began supporting the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which sought to create an independent state in southern Yemen.
Still, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi cooperated to blockade Qatar in 2017–2021, and the Saudis backed the Emiratis during the intensive Turkish–Emirati proxy war in Syria and Libya in 2019–2020. Also, the UAE’s decision to normalize ties with Israel in September 2020 appeared to have tacit Saudi approval. Riyadh itself was negotiating with the Israelis on possible normalization, but linked it to substantial Israeli concessions on the creation of a viable Palestinian state. However, the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank negatively affected Saudi–Israeli talks, and the outbreak of the Israeli–Palestinian War on 7 October 2023 resulted in their suspension. But the UAE continued to expand its partnership with Israel in spite of the genocidal Israeli campaign in the Gaza Strip.
Meanwhile, the eruption of the Sudanese Civil War in April 2023 further strained Saudi–Emirati relations, as Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt and Iran, is supporting the Sudanese government controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), while the UAE is backing the insurgent Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has been accused of perpetrating mass atrocities against the people of Darfur. In Libya, both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi support the Libyan National Army (LNA) under Khalifa Haftar, but recently both have exerted pressure on the LNA to do their bidding. The UAE supports the LNA to counter the rise of Islamists and to expand its influence in North and West Africa, and it has reportedly supplied weapons to the RSF via the LNA. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has nudged the LNA to cooperate with the Government of National Unity (GNU) to ensure stability and to stabilize oil production, and it, along with Egypt, has urged the LNA to stop arms supplies to the RSF. Moreover, Saudi Arabia signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Pakistan on 17 September 2025, and the UAE mirrored the move by establishing a Strategic Defense Partnership with Pakistan’s arch-rival India on 19 January 2026.
While the outcome of the Saudi–Emirati conflicts on other fronts is still far from certain, the Saudis have recently achieved a major breakthrough in Yemen. In late December, following an ultimatum by the Saudi-backed Yemeni government, the UAE withdrew its troops from the country, and Saudi Arabia started to conduct airstrikes on the UAE-backed STC. On 2 January 2026, the STC declared its intention to hold a referendum on the creation of an independent ‘State of South Arabia’ in two years. Riyadh responded by launching an unprecedented blitz against the STC, in which Yemeni government forces, backed by Saudi airstrikes, rapidly captured all STC-controlled territories in a week, and the STC dissolved itself on 9 January. This rare Saudi demonstration of kinetic strength displayed the UAE’s strategic overreach and their inability to directly oppose Saudi interests.
The US-Israeli-Iranian War, during which Iran struck both Saudi and Emirati territories, has ironically widened the gulf between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and indirectly helped the Saudis in their proxy war against the UAE in Sudan. As Iranian strikes caused serious economic losses and attrition of matériel in the UAE, their ability to arm the RSF declined considerably. As a result, the Saudi- and Egyptian-backed Sudanese government has recently achieved a string of victories against the RSF, rapidly reversing its earlier gains. Also, citing Pakistan’s growing ties with Saudi Arabia and ‘meek’ response to Iranian strikes on the UAE, Abu Dhabi demanded the repayment of $3.5 billion loan from Pakistan. In late April, Saudi Arabia provided Pakistan with $3 billion to repay the loan, and in exchange, Pakistan deployed 13,000 troops and 10–18 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia to shield it from potential attacks. Moreover, the UAE has expanded its ties with Somaliland, which is de facto independent but de jure a part of Somalia, and Abu Dhabi is reportedly lobbying other states to recognize its independence. In this case, the UAE is in sync with Israel, which recognized the statelet on 26 December 2025. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, along with Turkey and Egypt, supports Somalia’s federal government and territorial integrity.
Thus, despite being firmly anchored in the US-led Western bloc, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are engaged in a ‘cold war’ against each other due to competing regional ambitions in Asia and Africa, differing strategic and economic priorities, and divergent policies towards Israel and Iran. The cold war has added a new set of complexities to the already volatile politics of the Middle East, and is detrimental to regional stability and international security.
Implications for Bangladesh
Bangladesh shares close economic and political ties with both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE respectively hosting 3.5 million and 0.84 million Bangladeshi citizens, mostly migrant workers. Moreover, Dhaka fulfills a substantial part of its energy needs by importing crude and refined oil from these two states. Accordingly, Bangladesh has so far pursued a balanced policy towards them and carefully avoided picking any sides in the intra-Gulf Arab cold war. This policy has served the country well. However, if the Saudi–Emirati cold war escalates, Bangladesh may face pressures from both sides to pick a side, as Pakistan has recently found out to its peril. The two Gulf Arab states hold considerable leverage over Bangladesh via the issue of migration, and it can be used to influence the country’s policy. Hence, Dhaka should carefully monitor the developments in Saudi–Emirati relations, maintain cordial ties with both of them through rigorous diplomacy, and prioritize its long-term national interests over any short-term gains in dealing with this acute issue.
Md. Himel Rahman is a Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at Gopalganj Science and Technology University.
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