Iraqi nuke evidence was thin: Experts
The public case that Iraq was pursuing nuclear weapons was built primarily on several suspicious items Iraq reportedly tried to import, such as uranium, aluminum tubes and precision machinery. But the uranium story is now in dispute, and many of the other items had possible uses unrelated to nuclear weapons.
Other information was either lacking, or suggested that no nuclear program was in the works, said the former intelligence officials, who analyzed Iraq's weapons during the run-up to the war. Some spoke on the condition of anonymity.
For example, "There was no solid evidence that indicated Iraq's top nuclear scientists were rejuvenating Iraq's nuclear weapons program," said Greg Thielmann, the former manager of the State Department office that tracked chemical, biological and nuclear weapons issues. Thielmann retired in September 2002.
Other former officials said the scientists weren't performing activities or going to places normally associated with work on a nuclear weapons program.
However, the US National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons program said Iraq was trying to "re-establish and enhance its cadre of weapons personnel." The estimate was published in October.
The section of the classified document released Friday by the White House provided no details.
Before the war, UN nuclear inspectors at the International Atomic Energy Agency interviewed Iraq's nuclear scientists and found no indication that they were working on a weapons program.
"The whole thing was antiquated," said IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming. "These guys were aging, they weren't working collectively and the facilities and infrastructure was dilapidated."
In its estimate, the CIA and military intelligence agencies concluded that Saddam was again trying to realize his long dream of becoming a nuclear power.
Comments