Confusion of ambitions over Afghanistan

Necessary political will has to be found.
THERE have been different interpretations about the recently concluded London Conference on Afghanistan. Some have described it as having been hastily conceived with the principal intention of being a political face-saver for two unpopular leaders, Britain's Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai. Others have claimed that it united an important section of the international community pertaining to their further commitment to Afghanistan's future. A litmus test in this regard has been the strategic approach to the initiation of the latest ISAF armed 'Mashtraq' engagement in the Helmand province in the south of Afghanistan. Analysts might have disagreed on the modalities in London but have welcomed the broad consensus on the need to talk to the Taliban and to avoid civilian casualties as being the only way for brining a peaceful conclusion to the conflict in that country. The evolving scenario within Afghanistan has also assumed greater complexity with the Saudis now demanding that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar has given a clear commitment in writing that he is breaking with al-Qaeda -- something the Taliban have only hinted at in several of their previous communiques. The BBC has summed it up in one phrase -- 'Talk and fight is the new mantra.' It was interesting to observe the emerging realization among the US, NATO and Afghanistan's neighbours that efforts should now be undertaken to provide sufficient security for the people so that development can take place -- bottom up. For the first time such an approach is being preferred over past persistent statements that focused on the need to militarily defeat the Taliban and to rebuild the country from top downwards by promoting democracy. Such a new development, as has taken place in London, was unacceptable even six months ago, for Allied strategists as well as Russia, India and Iran. The Taliban are still seen as a threat to US security but this turnaround appears to have resulted out of the awareness that the NATO forces might not be "winning" the war against the Taliban and could possibly be sinking into a stalemate that was indirectly promoting a collapse of will not only in Europe and the US but also in Kabul. Such a view appears to have surfaced because of reports coming out of Afghanistan that the insurgents had not only refined their tactics to evade capture but were also disrupting American and Afghan operations, all the while containing risks to their ranks. It has also been alleged that they were mixing modern weapons with ancient signaling techniques (use of pigeons, dense puffs of smoke and kites) and that this was hampering progress in the Allied war efforts. There have also been suggestions that the Taliban are transforming from a primary provincial power to a canny but mostly unseen tech-savvy force, enjoying free movement and supremacy particularly within the significant Helmand province and other areas that provide rich revenues from poppy cultivation. In this context, it has therefore not been surprising to read reports that diplomats or intelligence agents from Britain, Norway and Germany as well as several humanitarian agencies such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross have already met with Taliban officials either in Pakistan or Afghanistan in the past twelve months. Humanitarian agencies are apparently trying to make sure that their staff is not attacked and that they are allowed to carry on with their medical and food distribution and also immunization campaigns in the areas controlled by the Taliban. It is understood that for European states contacts with the Taliban have been limited to trying to discover where their nationals are -- nationals who may have trained or fought with al-Qaeda or the Taliban and might be planning to launch suicide attacks in their home countries. That might be described more as a pre-emptive engagement. Philip Stephens writing in London's 'Financial Times' appears to have encapsulated the existing situation rather well by pointing out that the West is wavering between the enemy and the exit. After nearly a decade it is now growing quite clear that the West's intensive commitment to Afghanistan is understandably coming to an end. In 18 months US troops will start handing over responsibility to the Afghan army, province by province, and start withdrawing. Some European contingents might make a quicker dash for the exit. Yes, there are also promises of substantial long term Western funding for building Afghan security forces and economic development. However, the Afghans will be expected, quite logically, to come out of their dependency on the West. Their leaders will now be asked to take on real responsibility and create a working Afghan state with basic governance institutions such as a functioning bureaucracy, judiciary and police. It will be a tough call because the 30-year-long war has bred a kind of dependency among the Afghans -- whether as refugees or as free citizens -- that prevents their leaders taking real responsibility. One can only hope that the Afghan Administration and their Allies will be able to lure local fighters and commanders away from the Taliban by offering them meaningful jobs in development projects that Afghan tribal leaders help select. Such an approach, in the long run will also be consistent with the US programme CERP which has been approved by the US Congress. US lawmakers have set aside $1.3 billion under this programme. It is a discretionary fund for American officers. CERP money can be used for development projects, but the language in the bill says officers can use the money to support the "reintegration into Afghan society" of those who have given up fighting. This can be the suitable key and driver towards an inter-active engagement. However, there has to be bi-partisanship and accountability within this process. As in any other South Asian country, it will be tough eradicating or even reducing the level of corruption in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the necessary political will has to be found. This will, in turn, strengthen both the Afghan government as well as the structured tribal networks. General McChrystal has a vision. So does President Obama. Both want to create a situation that will nurture sufficient political capacity that would permit Afghans to move towards stability, better governance, expanded economic opportunity and effective security. Use of mere force in the Pashtun heartland might bring in some advantages, but it is unlikely to promote reconciliation. This factor will be especially important if Afghanistan is to exploit its reserves of mineral resources. Without inclusive peace nothing will work. Today, the international coalition in Afghanistan has lowered their sights. There is new realism but that should not just convey the impression that there is palpable eagerness of western governments to depart. The affirmation of resolve must not be lost in the signal that everyone is looking for a quick way out. Such a perception could then do more harm than good. Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador and can be reached at mzamir@dhaka.net
Comments