Two reviews from Syed Badrul Ahsan
History, with all the facts . . .

Abdul Matin's interest in history and in Bangladesh has never wavered. As an expatriate, he has found little reason not to reflect on what has been happening in the home country he left long ago to make a home in the West. From the distance of London he has, with something of determination and with a huge deal of principle, focused on the need to set the history of Bangladesh in the proper perspective. That Matin was on his way to being a commentator on Bangladesh came through as far back as the early 1970s, when he ventured into a work that was to emerge as Geneva-e Bangabandhu. He has come a long way since then. And in all the works he has come forth with thus far, Matin has deemed it refreshingly necessary to play by the rules. And that has consisted in adding to the substance of his works through bringing documentary evidence into it. It is what Matin does in his new work. In Koyekti Oitishashik Dolil, he brings into the public domain once more a theme writers in Bangladesh as well beyond its frontiers have struggled with, especially since August 1975. For Bengali scholars, especially for those who had reason to observe the rise of Bengali nationalism in the 1960s and the emergence of Bangladesh in the early 1970s at close quarters, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman remains not merely a point of reference but also a fascinating study in political leadership. For Matin, as for millions of others, Mujib remains the pivot around which Bengali politics, pre- as well as post-1975, has conducted itself. More importantly, though, Matin's emphasis has been on the dark propaganda, indeed the innuendoes, that have been made about the Father of the Nation by those who came after him or by those who had ample cause to benefit from his assassination. At the same time, Matin has found it necessary (which scholar of history will not?) to debunk the many myths surrounding the fall of Bangladesh's founder. He goes to considerable lengths, in this work as also in earlier ones, to persuade readers that Bangabandhu's death was not a simple matter of some soldiers shooting him down but part of a wider web of conspiracy laid at home and abroad. Abdul Matin deals in facts. And because he does, this work (as also his earlier ones) makes gripping reading. Notice that unlike so many others, he does not take recourse to hearsay when it comes to dwelling on the declaration of Bangladesh's independence. He proceeds headlong into a United States government report (Defence Intelligence Agency Spot Report) of 26 March 1971: Pakistan was thrust into civil war today when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman proclaimed the east wing of the two-part country to be "the sovereign independent People's Republic of Bangla Desh." Fighting is reported heavy in Dacca and other eastern cities . . . And there you have it. The argument of whether Mujib did or did not declare Bangladesh's freedom has no more validity. The truth is set out in that report. That said, a significant part of Matin's work deals with the events that were to shake Bangladesh violently on and after 15 August 1975. The writer goes to Keesing's Contemporary Archives (16 January 1976) to provide readers with an insight into the happenings between 3 and 7 November 1975. Note the chilling comment on the death of the four Mujibnagar leaders in prison: "The Majors" had meanwhile apparently given orders for the killing of the four imprisoned ministers, who were shot and bayoneted to death during the night of Nov. 2-3, although reports differed on whether the deaths took place before or after the coup began . . . Keesing's goes on: Colonel Farook told journalists on Nov. 5 that he regretted the "unnecessary killings" on Aug. 15 but not the murder of President Mujib, which he had himself ordered. It was announced on Nov. 30 that the officers had been granted political asylum in Libya. Matin sets the record straight, through citing all the unimpeachable sources behind the arguments he makes. He reproduces the famous article (Food Politics) by Emma Rothschild and thereby gives Bangladesh's people as well as those who have long held the Mujib government responsible for the famine of 1974 some serious thoughts to mull over. Consider the following from the Rothschild article: . . . U.S. agreements to supply food as aid under the PL 480 program were also delayed, mainly because officials were negotiating in secret as to whether Bangladesh was disqualified from receiving aid because it had sold jute to Cuba earlier in the year. . . By the time the American food arrived in Bangladesh, in December 1974, the autumn famine was over. The appendices in the book make terrifically worthwhile reading. Matin digs up all the old records of Bangabandhu's assassins publicly gloating over their act (re Farook's 'I helped to kill Mujib', et cetera). The writer specifically refers to Stanley Wolpert's work on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to explain how leftists in Bangladesh were busily engaged in the conspiracy to bump Mujib off. Wolpert quotes from a letter written by Abdul Huq, a leftwing underground Bengali politician, to Bhutto (the letter is now in the Bhutto family archives in Karachi): Abdul Huq, general secretary of Bangladesh's Marxist-Leninist Communist Party, had written on 16 December 1974 to "My dear Prime Minister" Bhutto, with "much pain and anguish" to appeal "for funds, arms and wireless instruments" to use against the "puppet Mujib clique . . . totally divorced from the people." That "TOP SECRET/MOST IMMEDIATE" letter reached Zulfi on 16 January 1975, when he minuted on its margin "Important," authorizing "help" for this "honest man," whom Bhutto rated as "fairly effective . . ." Matin goes on to quote Wolpert further: Abdul Malek, another one of Zulfi's agents in destabilizing Bangladesh, travelled to Saudi Arabia for support in the promised 'liberation of 65 million Muslims (of Bangladesh), who are anxiously waiting for your guidance and leadership'. Read on. And you will get a sense of how Bangladesh was betrayed in the years immediately after its triumph on the battlefield against Pakistan. It is a compelling work.
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