Small states and how they worry about security
Shahid Alam studies a recent work and relates it to a global context
28 September 2007, 18:00 PM
Contemporary Security Issues
in the Asia-Pacific and Bangladesh,
Mohd. Aminul Karim
Academic Press and Publishers Library, Dhaka
Any serious undertaking on security-related issues in any part of the globe should arouse the interest of specialists on the subject matter, as well as most ardent enthusiasts. Mohd. Aminul Karim, a senior army officer on active duty, through nine essays composed over an eleven-year period, from 1995 to 2006, adds to the considerable literature already existing on the topic of security. He limits his geographic attention to the Asia-Pacific region, with particular emphasis on the security-related concerns of Bangladesh. For the record, the nine discourses, which have either been published in journals, or presented at conferences, are, in order of their presentation: "Bangladesh's Dilemma between Traditional Security and Development Issues in the Regional Environment", "American Geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific", "Nuclear Doctrines of Indo-Pakistan: A Comparative Analysis", "Power Politics in the Indian Ocean Region after the Cold War", "National Security of Bangladesh: A Comprehensive View", "Geostrategic Environment of Bangladesh", "Civil-Military Relations in Bangladesh: A Perspective", "Higher Defence Organization: A Bangladesh Perspective", and "Bureaucracy and Civil Society in the Reform Process of Bangladesh".
A cursory glance at the titles of the first eight articles should convey the impression that they are all security-related, but the last, even in terms of its content, would stretch one's imagination to count it in that category, unless one is ready to accept the author's contention that a more "dynamic and positive" bureaucracy and a "vigorous and rich" civil society would contribute significantly towards the country's security. Even though the articles have been written at different times, in several instances, when going through them sequentially, one gets an unmistakable feeling of déjà vu that one has read chunks of propositions and arguments in some previous piece. And so one has, on a number of occasions, and in almost the same configuration of language and style. Unless the author, knowingly or inadvertently, was trying to draw close attention to his strongly-held views on every available occasion, one really does not see the necessity of the rather bewildering repetitions kept intact in all the affected essays presented in the form of an anthology.
Some of those steadfastly-held views are worth a mention because they reflect certain truisms contained in the concept of security in modern times: that it "is the domain of both the civil and military men", that "it is achieved through a well-articulated policy determined at the highest level of government", that it "is a very broad term encompassing political, economic, social, military and environmental aspects", and that the "spectrum covering both human and traditional security has to be strengthened in order for Bangladesh to survive as a self-respecting nation". There are others, some open to question, like his contention that "South Asia may witness more nuclear-related parleys, explosions and threat to unclear (sic, should be nuclear) war", or that Bangladesh is a geopivotal state, or vague and/or ambiguous, like his advocacy of the acceleration of economic reforms through trade liberalisation, however keeping in mind 'the India factor', and some may appear baffling, rushed, or, at times, self-contradictory. To take a case in point: "one may argue that standing military is a luxury for a poor nation like Bangladesh" is followed immediately by, "A standing armed force, apart from its being considered a symbol of sovereignty and national pride and dignity, also contributes in peacekeeping at the national, regional and global level." A transition sentence or two would do wonders in making clear exactly what the author is driving at.
Karim seems to be, in a few articles, unsure or patchy about his arguments in support of his contentions, but he is on much sounder ground in "American Geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific". This is not to say that at least some parts of the piece would not be contested the very nature of the subject matter of security would be sure to raise a variety of spirited opinions and debate but he treats the theme as exhaustively as is possible within the severe constraints of the space allocated for the article. The following lines provide a fine example of both a truism and a controversy: "Some say geoeconomics has replaced the geopolitics (sic) as a science of statecraft. But that cannot be accepted in its entirety since realpolitics (sic) or power politics embodies all types of interactions like strategy, geography, military power and of course the overriding economic power." One does not have to tax one's brain too much to witness umpteen examples of the primacy of realpolitik in the conduct of inter-state relations in the anarchic international system, where the self-serving nation-state reigns supreme, but when was economics not a key element in the pursuit of statecraft? One of the security studies specialists Karim refers to, Paul Kennedy, places particular emphasis upon the interaction between economics and strategy. His thesis, in his monumental The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (1987), based on his study of international conflict during the period he covers, is that wealth is usually a prime requisite to support military power, while military power is very often the key element necessary to acquire and protect wealth. He, however, warns of the danger that may arise as a result of an imbalance between the two.
In fact, geopolitics (some of the theories related to the concept are discussed at some length by the author in the article under discussion) was given a bad name (like the swastika) by the Nazis, when one of its leading theoretical gurus, Karl Haushofer, presented it with the idea of Lebensraum ("living space") to pursue in practice. It was really an economic imperialism theory that was subsumed under the racial supremacy hypothesis. Several scholars have, at different times, expressed their opinion that economic power is greater than military strength for a country's security in times of peace. Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, for instance, believe, with good reason, that "economic strength that is used for national security purposes in time is the embodiment of military power" (The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, 1967). Robert E. Klitgaard goes even further: "It is a truism that a nation's power is not measured solely in military terms, that its ability to coerce or threaten (or withstand either) may, especially in the absence of hot war, be more related to economic strength than strength of arms" (National Security and Export Controls, 1974).
Karim encapsulates his vision for Bangladesh's security thus: strengthening its democracy, which should be upheld as a core value of the nation, pursuing multilateralism, engagement, balancing between greater powers, strengthening national power through military modernisation, and improving its internal security and resilience. "Bangladesh cannot afford to antagonize its neighbors nor should she, as a self-respecting nation, embrace submissiveness. She should not bandwagon but she should fine-tune (her) balancing abilities." The author seems to be overly concerned with India's might (real, but, at times, overblown by its own propagandists) as well as that of China (more credible than that of New Delhi's), and appears not to be sure about how to deal with the reality of two large regional powers in very close proximity to his country. In this context, one has to bring up his use of the term "India's Monroe Doctrine" as a misnomer, both as to its antecedents as well as the reality that the United States already has a considerable presence in its vicinity.
To recapitulate: President James Monroe, in his address before the US Congress on 2 December 1823, unilaterally decided "that the American Continents…are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power." To justify the doctrine, Secretary of State (later President) John Quincy Adams made a simple statement: "It would be more candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France than to come in as a cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war." What he did not say is that the doctrine relied for its enforcement on British naval supremacy, and that British interests in the Americas would be safeguarded by the policy. In the present international system, that role reversal probably applies to US-India relations, where New Delhi would be happy to be recognised as a sub-regional policeman (although that is a role it cannot perform in the context of Pakistan), while Washington uses it as part of its barely-disguised policy of establishing its version of cordon sanitaire against China (the author dwells at some length on this aspect of the current US-India axis in several of his essays).
As mentioned, Karim does not seem to be on firm ground when discussing Bangladesh's security vis-à-vis India. Policymakers may engage in intense debate over the issue, but Md. Abdul Halim's view, which finds independent reflection in Karim's writing, should be a basic premise and a guideline for any policy contemplated by Dhaka: "In fact, India has always proved to be a double-edged sword for Bangladesh: the bigger country strives to keep the latter within its own security umbrella but poses a threat to the security of the smaller neighbour who finds it hard to pursue an independent security policy in such a situation" (Bangladesh on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century).
The author recognises the preponderance of US power and interest in the Asia-Pacific region while it lets India be its proxy in South Asia. As an academic shrewdly observes, the US sets its international agenda from the perspective of its national interests, and then applies planned, as well as extemporaneous means to achieve its goals. For it, globalism is essentially a function of statism, which emphasises the supremacy of sovereign nation-states. For it, national security and national interest are often one and indivisible. Washington has a military presence, ranging from advisors to full-fledged bases, in some 120 countries, while its transnational corporations (TNCs) operate in almost 200. Therefore, its economic interests are vitally linked with the security and smooth functioning of those TNCs, and any forced disruption in their activities might be cause for the invocation of its national interest being threatened and for the possible use of force from any of its bases abroad.
In terms of a firmly-held view of Karim, Colin Gray, another noted geopolitical theorist that the author refers to in other contexts, offers this piece of sound advice: "Since defence policy must support foreign policy in a design for national security, logically and prudently there should be a constant dialogue between defence policy means and foreign policy ends" (The Geopolitics of Super Power, 1988). Karim, however, makes no bones about his disappointment with the quality of the country's civil service and diplomatic corps. While he vigorously disagrees with M.M. Khan's (presumably, since the year referred to, 1998, does not appear in any of the citations he provides in his endnotes to the paper) castigation of the bureaucracy, categorising it as "excessive total dismal picture of the system", he does recognise that "there could be some truth in it." As for his hope in civil society (so-called, in this reviewer's view) being able to contribute meaningfully towards Bangladesh's security, he might be hoping way, way, way too much from that quarter!
Shahid Alam is Head, Media & Communications Department, Independent University, Bangladesh.
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