Transiting from a nation to a nation-state

Shahid Alam assesses a work on Bangladesh's place on the globe

Emergence of a New Nation in a Multi-Polar World: Bangladesh
Mizanur Rahman Shelley
Academic Press and Publishers Library

The fourth edition of Emergence of a New Nation in a Multi-Polar World: Bangladesh is made up of two distinct parts: the original text, made up of seven chapters, and an addendum, consisting of the remaining three. Although the author informs us that it is revised and enlarged, the reader could only be sure about the expanded portion, but not about exactly where the revision has taken place. The introduction to the latest edition offers no clue, although it does say that it "contains new chapters on the various global, regional and national developments that have occurred since the 1970's." The first edition was comprised of the following chapters: "The Birth of a New State in a Polycentric World", "From Autonomy to Secession", "India's Role: Intervention or Humanitarian Help?", "The Soviet Union's Stand on Bangladesh: The Context of the Sino-Soviet Rift", "China: On the Horns of a Dilemma: To Help an Ally or Support a People's War?", "The United States: Complicating Factor --- Nixon's Policy Towards China and the Bangladesh Crisis", and "Conclusion: Bangladesh --- Pioneer or Lone Ranger?". The edition under review adds the following: "Epilogue: Global, Regional, National Changes and Developments: 1975-2006", "State Building, Nation Building and Parliamentary Democracy in Bangladesh", and "Terrorism and National Security Bangladesh: Potent frontier in the war against extremist terror". The original book, which grew out of the author's postgraduate studies at the University of London, concentrated on the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign independent state. Shelley carried out the study largely from the perspective of the prevailing international system in the very late 1960s and very early 1970s. Therefore, greater emphasis is given to the positioning of, and interplay among, the major global powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and the regional powers, the closely and actively involved India, and the enigmatic China, than to the various political and economic factors (not that they were totally neglected) that were instrumental in, first, foreshadowing, and, then, bringing about, the birth of Bangladesh, which, in Shelley's words, was "the first state to be born in blood and fire in a polycentric world." A number of points from the first edition should interest both the casual reader as well as the serious student of the birth of Bangladesh, "the first postcolonial state to emerge in the wake of successful military efforts and their ally." Although many would cogently agree with the author that "political factors, rather than economic, ethnic and cultural ones, were the catalyst of the Bangladesh revolution", others might, with compelling rationale, have a different take on the significance of the factors. There are other contentious issues, some that will take a long time to resolve satisfactorily, if they can so be resolved at all, but almost all have arisen because Shelley's political history has been written too close after the events that culminated in the emergence of Bangladesh. And history, most of all political history, is best written from a distance in time, when new evidences come to light, the principal and minor actors have departed for eternity, and the chronicler would less likely be passionately moved by the events, their antecedents, and their critical and sensitive ramifications. To the author's credit, he is fully aware of this imposed shortcoming: "…only the historians of the future, with their advantage of studying an adequately documented past, will perhaps be able to unravel the many mysteries which cannot be understood with the tools and resources of the contemporary analyst. Many of the official documents relating to the emergence of Bangladesh are still "classified material" and will remain so for years to come." In providing a bird's eye view, as it were, of the events leading up to the military crackdown in 1971, the author has some interesting observations and comments with wider implications than their bare words. One was that the Basic Democracies scheme, which was "aimed at transforming the tone and tenor of East Bengali politics", had no mass support and little effective effort to build such support. True, but it was also an early effort at political engineering drawn up primarily by Harvard University-based American social scientists to configure postcolonial nations to the United States' preference, to eventually mold them in its own image, to ultimately make them a part of its postcolonial order of things. One may take note of similar schemes and undertakings that have been, and are being, undertaken by the same forces in this age of globalization, for essentially the same purpose, in Bangladesh and other developing countries. And, there is this bit about the presidential and legislative elections of 1965 in Pakistan: the Awami League and NAP formed an alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami, Council Muslim League and the National Democratic Front to square off against President Ayub Khan and his faction of the Muslim League. Some things have not changed in Bangladesh! It does, however, underscore the reality of the politics of expediency in Bangladesh, as well as in a considerable number of countries. Shelley, for understandable reasons, has dwelt at some length on India's involvement and role in the Bangladesh affair. The following excerpt is as revealing of New Delhi's contribution to Dhaka's liberation struggle as it is of a supreme irony that has characterised Indo-Bangladesh relations: "…an extraordinary combination of factors: a substantially though not formally favorable international setting, the folly and shortsightedness of Pakistan's military rulers, the practical wisdom of the Indian political leaders, the superior military strength of India and last but not least, the determination of the Bengali freedom-fighters to achieve liberation at any cost --- all helped transform India's involvement in the Bangladesh struggle into a classic case of successful intervention…. India…had acquired a friend and ally in the east in the form of Bangladesh. The fact that this new state, though overwhelmingly Muslim in population and an erstwhile part of Pakistan, declared allegiance to the principle of secularism in politics seemed to underscore the strength of the Indian philosophy of a secular polity which had suffered a great setback in 1947…." Events subsequent to Bangladesh's liberation have brought to light certain realities that, in retrospect, appear so ironic in the context of 1971, when India was inextricably linked to her eastern neighbour's independence struggle. Even that cooperation was heavily dictated by India's national self-interest. K. Subramaniam (possibly the same Subrahmanyam, the Director of India's Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, to whom Shelley refers to?) put it bluntly: India did not dismember Pakistan to solve the refugee problem it was burdened with. "To maintain that is utter rubbish. India went to war to satisfy the nationalist and popular view that the dismemberment of Pakistan was in the long interest of India" (Organizer, 13 July 1974). And, regarding Shelley's conclusion that New Delhi had secured a friend and ally in Dhaka, former secretary to the government of India and water-related problems expert Ramaswamy R. Iyer offers this shrewd, and very matter-of-fact observation: "…the (Indian) assistance given to the Bangladeshi liberation struggle…was bungled as it failed to ensure a stable and friendly relationship with Bangladesh: instead, for the major part of the last three decades India has had a hostile Bangladesh to contend with. Even after a 'friendly' government came into power in Bangladesh that government has to look over its shoulder constantly for fear of being considered too friendly to India which is the worst possible abuse that can be hurled at anyone in Bangladesh…. Let us face it. There is a deep visceral anti-India feeling in Bangladesh…and this cannot be fully explained with reference to anything that India might have done or failed to do" (The Daily Star, May 22, 2001). On the face of it, these lines do not need much elaboration, but they do require serious mulling over by policymakers, especially those in India. Regarding the actual timing and level of military support provided by India, Shelley is rather circumspect on both counts. Col. (retired) Brian Cloughley is in no doubt: open Indian military support for the freedom-fighters was in evidence as early as by June, 1971, including artillery firing across the border (A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections, 2000). Alluding to former Indian Gen. Sukhwant Singh for corroboration, he also asserts that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was already planning on taking military action in East Pakistan very early in 1971. And Seymour Hersh reveals that former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was convinced by May that "…Mrs. Gandhi had ordered plans for a lightning "Israeli-type" attack to take over East Pakistan" (Kissinger: The Price of Power). The enlarged section in the fourth edition, while including relevant contemporary topics, is also marred by carelessness. For example, while Shelley cites authors like Sydney Bailey (1996), Rounaq Jahan (1980), A.M. Hasanuzzaman (1998), and Talukder Maniruzzaman (1994) and their books in their endnotes to Chapter VIII, they do not find their way in the bibliography of books consulted, while the one edited by him (1992) does. Though small, it is still a significant oversight. The chapter on state building, nation building and parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh (IX) is instructive in more ways than one. A good example may be found in this thoughtful and revealing analysis: "The contradictions between the Awami League and the BNP on foreign policy matters, especially Indo-Bangladesh relations not only stunted the growth of broad national consensus on important domestic issues but also effectively blocked the emergence of bipartisanship in foreign policy matters during the period of resurrected parliamentary democracy from 1991." However, Chapter X has, possibly for reasons of dearth of adequate relevant information, not quite fulfilled the expectation of incisive discourse on the very important topic of extremist terror in the context of Bangladesh. While the fourth edition of Emergence of a New Nation in a Multi-Polar World: Bangladesh would be a useful reference point for learning about great and regional power interplay during Bangladesh's liberation struggle, the reader might reasonably look for a much fuller separate treatment of the expanded section from Mizanur Rahman Shelley in order to get a better grasp of the dysfunctional political culture that, paradoxically, flourished during the fifteen years unbroken stretch of parliamentary democracy in the country. Shahid Alam is a writer, former diplomat and at present Head, Media and Communications Department, Independent University, Bangladesh.