What BJP’s win in West Bengal means for Bangladesh

The rise of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in West Bengal is more than just another electoral outcome. It represents a deeper structural shift along India’s eastern frontier, one that carries significant implications for Bangladesh. For years, West Bengal operated as a quiet counterbalance within India’s federal framework, at times slowing or reshaping decisions emerging from New Delhi. That moderating layer is now eroding. With BJP in control both at the centre and in Kolkata, India’s eastern policy is poised to become more centralised, ideologically cohesive, and administratively decisive. For Dhaka, this signals a transition from dealing with a fragmented system to confronting a far more unified—though less accommodating—neighbour.

This shift creates a dual reality. Greater alignment within India may reduce the inconsistencies that once complicated bilateral engagement. But it also removes the informal cushions Bangladesh often relied on: those moments when state-level resistance could delay, dilute or deflect central policies. What now emerges instead is a more predictable yet more rigid framework of engagement.

The impact will be especially pronounced in water diplomacy as the long-delayed Teesta water-sharing agreement continues to symbolise the limitations of past negotiations. When India’s then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh travelled to Dhaka in 2011, the agreement was on the verge of conclusion before it was blocked by Mamata Banerjee. With that obstacle now removed, there could be a narrow opening for renewed talks.

However, the political arithmetic within West Bengal complicates this optimism. BJP’s strong support in northern districts, where the Teesta flows, means that any agreement will have to account for local electoral pressures. To add to that, competing agricultural demands, India’s broader river management strategies, and the fragile ecology of the delta continue to tilt the balance. While administrative coherence may accelerate negotiations, it does not ensure equitable outcomes. Bangladesh will need to push harder for basin-wide frameworks, credible data-sharing, and enforceable safeguards.

On the border, changes are likely to be swift and visible. A more synchronised Indian approach is expected to tighten surveillance, complete fencing, and strengthen coordination between agencies such as the Border Security Force (BSF). This transition from a loosely managed frontier to a more securitised one may reduce illicit movement, but it will also disrupt informal economies that sustain millions on both sides.

More concerning is the potential human cost. Bangladeshi civilian killings along the border, long a source of tension, could increase under a stricter enforcement regime. Without meaningful accountability and restraint, greater control may deepen grievances rather than resolve them, turning the border into a site of recurring humanitarian concern.

Politically, too, a striking parallel is emerging across the frontier. In Bangladesh’s recent parliamentary election in February, Jamaat-e-Islami strengthened its position in border constituencies, while the BJP has now also consolidated its influence in adjacent districts on the Indian side. This convergence points to a broader shift: communities historically linked by language and culture are increasingly gravitating towards religious identity-driven politics. Thus, the border, once defined by interdependence, now risks hardening into a line of polarisation.

It is also worth noting here the recent developments in another neighbouring Indian state, Assam, under Himanta Biswa Sarma. Over the past year, he has not only sharpened anti-Bangladesh rhetoric but also openly described controversial border practices operating outside formal diplomatic channels. In public remarks, he outlined so-called “pushback” operations, where individuals labelled as “illegal Bangladeshis” are detained and forced across the border without completing formal deportation procedures. He also acknowledged the lack of coordination with Dhaka, and indicated that such actions may involve individuals brought from other parts of India, and suggested that strained bilateral ties make these practices easier to carry out. The scale is significant. According to Bangladesh authorities, at least 2,436 people—including Indian nationals and the Rohingya—were pushed into Bangladesh between May and December in 2025.

While these practices have so far been largely associated with Assam, the BJP’s control of West Bengal raises the possibility of their wider application. From now on, border districts in West Bengal may increasingly see stricter enforcement and a rise in such “push-in” incidents, expanding what was once a region-specific approach into a broader pattern along India’s eastern frontier.

Economic dynamics add another layer of complexity. A BJP-led West Bengal is likely to push forward infrastructure, industrial expansion, and improved connectivity with India’s northeast. While Bangladesh may benefit from enhanced transit and energy cooperation, these gains come with trade-offs. The formalisation of economic flows threatens informal cross-border livelihoods, and a more competitive West Bengal could challenge Bangladeshi exports in sectors like textiles and jute. Economic engagement, therefore, requires careful calibration rather than automatic optimism.

Cultural and political sensitivities are also set to intensify. A more assertive Indian stance on minority issues in Bangladesh, amplified through political and media channels, could strain relations further, particularly as Islamist-leaning forces gain visibility within Bangladesh. In this environment, narratives and perceptions may prove as consequential as policy decisions themselves.

There is also a broader strategic layer to consider. As India consolidates its eastern flank, it is likely to view Bangladesh’s external engagements—particularly with China—through a more security-conscious lens. This could narrow Dhaka’s room for manoeuvre, even as it seeks to balance economic opportunities with geopolitical realities.

Against this backdrop, traditional diplomacy alone will not suffice. Bangladesh must adjust to a more centralised and ideologically assertive India by strengthening technical negotiations, investing in data-driven policymaking, and diversifying its strategic engagements. The fundamental challenges such as water security, border governance, and economic resilience remain the same, but the context in which they must be addressed is likely to grow more complex and more political. Navigating this new terrain will require clarity, discipline, and strategic resolve from Dhaka.

In a region shaped by climate stress and shifting geopolitical currents, cooperation remains essential. However, it must be anchored in a clear-eyed defence of Bangladesh’s interests, rather than assumptions inherited from a different political moment.

Jannatul Naym Pieal is a writer, researcher, and journalist. He can be reached at jn.pieal@gmail.com.

Views expressed in this article are the author's own. 

Follow The Daily Star Opinion on Facebook for the latest opinions, commentaries, and analyses by experts and professionals. To contribute your article or letter to The Daily Star Opinion, see our guidelines for submission.