Oversight without independence?

The Bangladesh Telecommunication (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025—approved on Wednesday by the council of advisers—appears to be little more than a repackaging of existing frameworks and practices, embellished with cosmetic changes. While the proposed dismantling of the controversial National Telecommunication Monitoring Centre (NTMC) is a long-awaited and widely supported step, its replacement with a body vested with nearly identical powers and under similar government control renders the reform largely superficial. Under the ordinance, a new entity, called the Centre for Information Support (CIS), would be established within the home ministry, effectively continuing the NTMC's role as an intelligence-gathering arm of the state responsible for internal security and law enforcement.

Reports indicate that the ordinance introduces a three-member "quasi-judicial council" tasked with reviewing, approving, amending, or rejecting interception requests. However, as the council is to be chaired by the minister of law, justice and parliamentary affairs, and will include the principal staff officer as well as the secretary of the home ministry as members, the ordinance effectively expands the government's ability to deploy surveillance against its citizens. It is difficult to believe that such a body could operate independently, free from political or institutional influence.

For years, the NTMC has faced criticism for alleged human rights violations and for facilitating illegal and unregulated surveillance, including enforced disappearances carried out by various security and law enforcement agencies. The Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances has also documented the NTMC's involvement in several such cases in detail. Yet the new draft ordinance largely overlooks concerns repeatedly raised by human rights defenders. Expecting aggrieved individuals to seek redress through a so-called quasi-judicial council composed of senior government officials is neither convincing nor reassuring.

Although the ordinance includes some positive measures—such as banning internet shutdowns and criminalising unauthorised interception, data collection, retention, and misuse—it still falls far short of meaningful reform that aligns with international human rights obligations. Provisions promoting transparency in interception approvals and requiring council decisions to be auditable are commendable. However, so long as the government retains full control over the oversight mechanism, these measures risk becoming ineffectual. The replacement of the NTMC, coupled with the expanded scope of surveillance and weakened accountability in the approved draft, requires urgent reconsideration.

A genuinely independent oversight body with quasi-judicial authority can only exist when government functionaries are excluded from its composition. The original proposal—calling for one representative nominated by the president, one by the prime minister, and one by the speaker of parliament, alongside a retired High Court Division judge and a retired district and sessions judge—should be reinstated. Without such safeguards, the CIS risks becoming not a reform but a regression, potentially even more concerning than the NTMC it seeks to replace.