Nuclear deterrents

Dr. M. S. Haq, On e-mail
In my previous newspaper articles on nuclear and nuclear related matters, I suggested, among other things, to the US and other nuclear weapon countries about the need for speeding up efforts towards perfecting anti-nuke weapon technologies - against the backdrop of contemporary risks, threats and vulnerabilities associated with possible nuclear war or wars. I even went to propose, among other things, to world people - a bunch of engineering possibilities associated with it: as to how to disable at source (for example) nuclear headed missiles or to disable them before firing from any place of the world at any time, all with the help of, say, identification and breaking up of relevant security codes through an integrative and synchronized anti-nuke weapon technology to be developed on a composite of cyber technology, imaging technology, robotics, remote control mechanism and servo mechanism. One of the aims of my proposals was to supplement and complement the present day diplomacy in areas of what I would call the nuke peace and to enhance the chances for protecting the world and for that matter the universe from devastating consequences and ramifications of nuclear attacks in at least the foreseeable future. The choice of the word “chances” in the above sentence is deliberate because one of the assumptions here is: by the time nuke deterrents (at least of some sort) would be in place, there could exist new or additional or both challenges for protecting those deterrents from say, possible events of disablement. The responsibility associated with say, developing, sustaining and promoting anti-nuke weapon technologies lies, in varying degrees though, on both nuclear weapon countries and non-nuclear weapon countries of the world. But an aggregate of efforts (I mean known efforts) towards harnessing, sustaining and promoting opportunities of arts, sciences, engineering and technology in pursuits of for example, counteracting and neutralizing (at least to an acceptable extent) - in a proactive, reactive or other manner - undesirable effects or undesirable side effects (or both) of products of quantum engineering have not so far been found to be adequate for meeting the demand side and the supply side (as applicable) of nuclear deterrents. Further, the present day size, mode and level of transaction in the domain of anti-nuke weapon has not yet been able to attract, harness and sustain maximum benefits in pertinent areas from an increasingly borderless world for most of the world countries. One of the reasons for that is - the world is yet to become borderless in a way that could be instrumental in inter alia triggering, through out the world, anti-nuke weapon cooperation (technological, non-technological) to the satisfaction of world people. In the midst of above and other developments, it is interesting to note, the president of Russia has declared recently that his country would have guaranteed nuclear deterrents by 2020. It implies inter alia countries like Russia are preparing for combating future nuke war or wars with the help of anti-nuke weapons, per se. In that respect, it is expected Russia will be mindful about: one, identifying possible side effects and other effects associated with the nuclear deterrents at operation and non-operation levels; two, developing measures for neutralizing above effects; three, making them (I mean the deterrents) full proof against challenges from new generation nuke weapons; four, protecting those nuclear deterrents from terrorists and other anti-people, as well as anti-state elements; and five building the deterrents on sound and competitive scientific and engineering principles - capable of providing to the users, maximum service at the minimum cost under all possible conditions in a sustainable manner; to mention a few. Last word: technological breakthroughs in areas of anti-nuke weapon are, among other things and at this point in time, critical to protecting, preserving and promoting the nuke peace in the world.