Bangladesh running out of options on Rohingya crisis: Is there a way out?

Nine years after the Rohingya genocide and refugee crisis, Myanmar has changed. As the country continues to be ravaged by the ongoing civil war, few places have changed more profoundly than Rakhine State, which neighbours Bangladesh. The entire governance structure has changed hands, with Naypyidaw’s armed forces having been ousted by the Arakan Army (AA), a powerful ethnic armed group led and manned by members of the state’s Rakhine majority community. The political wing of the AA, known as the United League of Arakan, now administers most of Rakhine and some areas of Chin State, including the entire frontier region bordering Bangladesh. On the ground, Myanmar currently has no border crossings with Bangladesh under its control. The maritime equation is somewhat different, as the regime’s naval forces retain a conventional edge, preventing the AA from overrunning the state capital, Sittwe.

The retreat of the armed forces responsible for the 2017 genocide and the rise of Rakhine’s majority community have not eased the burdens faced by the Rohingya. Rather, they have produced a fresh wave of at least 150,000 people arriving in Bangladesh, this time fleeing the AA rather than government forces.

Human Rights Watch has now confirmed that AA fighters opened fire on Rohingya civilians in the village of Hoyyar Siri, Buthidaung Township, in May 2024, killing at least 170 people, including 90 children, during their advance on a nearby Myanmar army position. Rohingya activists claim Hoyyar Siri is just the tip of the iceberg and that AA massacres of Rohingya civilians are taking place throughout the region. Such allegations are echoed by those fleeing Rakhine, around 50 to 60 of whom continue to cross into Bangladesh every week.

For many years, Myanmar had refused to create conditions that would allow for the rehabilitation and return of Rohingya refugees. But after losing much of Rakhine State, the Myanmar government is showing a sudden interest in reviving the hitherto stalled repatriation process, identifying 308,797 refugees in Bangladesh as displaced residents of the country.

For many years, Myanmar had refused to create conditions that would allow for the rehabilitation and return of Rohingya refugees. But after losing much of Rakhine State, the Myanmar government is showing a sudden interest in reviving the hitherto stalled repatriation process, identifying 308,797 refugees in Bangladesh as displaced residents of the country. Such a sudden admission, nine years into the crisis, has raised suspicions about the intentions of a government well known for manipulating the crisis. Many suspect that the timing is not accidental: an ICJ verdict in The Gambia v. Myanmar is expected later this year, and Naypyidaw may hope such gestures will soften the blow.

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A view of the Kutupalong refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, home to Rohingya displaced from neighbouring Myanmar. Photo: Wikipedia

Myanmar has played this card before. In November 2017, its officials rushed to sign a repatriation arrangement with Bangladesh just 12 days before the United Nations Human Rights Council was due to convene a rare special session to address the mass violence against the Rohingya. The timing was designed precisely to enable an argument that international intervention was unnecessary in what was being presented as a bilateral crisis.

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Dhaka has rejected Myanmar’s figures as ‘erroneous’, pointing out that they fail to account for hundreds of thousands of children born to Rohingya parents in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. This might become a point of future contention. Some voices are advocating their right to Bangladeshi citizenship by virtue of their birth. Many of these advocates might have genuine humanitarian intentions, but such a position is not pragmatic in the case of refugees from Myanmar. It could kill all hopes of Rohingya repatriation once and for all. The Rohingya desperately need to preserve their identity as a people of Myanmar, with a right to citizenship in their homeland.

Limits of the Hague

Despite the practical limitations on the ground, where the Arakan Army continues to maintain an iron grip, effectively negating any decision taken by Naypyidaw, the ICJ verdict carries significant symbolic and political value. The verdict, expected later this year, stands out as one of the few formal processes holding Myanmar accountable for human rights violations against the Rohingya. But contrary to the widespread initial optimism in the refugee camps, where there was once much expectation that Myanmar would be forced to take back the Rohingya, the court has no enforcement mechanism of its own. Any question of enforcing an ICJ judgment may ultimately be referred to the UN Security Council for further action, and the overall process can be incredibly slow.

Opponents of the regime hope the ruling will at least disrupt Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s current charm offensive. He has stepped into the civilian role of president following what has been widely described as a fraudulent election process. But as regional giants China and India roll out the red carpet, diplomats in Naypyidaw hope the ruling will have limited diplomatic impact. The opposition camp might also be hesitant to use the ICJ ruling against the regime because there was widespread popular support for anti-Rohingya policies at the time of the genocide. It will be interesting to see whether anti-Rohingya sentiments inside Myanmar have changed over time and through the shared experience of state atrocities.

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Rohingya carry their belongings as they flee ethnic and religious persecution in Myanmar. Photo: Reuters

Diplomatic deadlock

A decade into the predicament, Bangladesh has found itself unable to devise a strategy commensurate with a crisis that transcends its borders. A high-level committee under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has been formed to find one, but critics say the underlying problem remains, as it has for years, trapped between committee rooms and seminar halls. Meanwhile, international actors are more interested in managing the crisis than in finding an enduring solution.

Most countries in the region, including China and India, have been inclined towards Myanmar rather than Bangladesh. Myanmar’s membership of the regional bloc ASEAN since 1997 has also given it an edge. ASEAN heavyweight Indonesia, which played a significant role during the 1991–92 Rohingya refugee crisis, avoided taking similar responsibility in 2017.

Most countries in the region, including China and India, have been inclined towards Myanmar rather than Bangladesh. Myanmar’s membership of the regional bloc ASEAN since 1997 has also given it an edge. ASEAN heavyweight Indonesia, which played a significant role during the 1991–92 Rohingya refugee crisis, avoided taking similar responsibility in 2017. Malaysia, the second frontline state in the refugee crisis, has been the sole member of the bloc interested in the rehabilitation of the Rohingya. Even then, it is difficult to miss how the entire region has sidestepped the crimes against humanity and what is now a protracted refugee crisis.

This isolation has resulted in Bangladesh bearing much of the burden, while crimes against the Rohingya continue to go unpunished, with little chance of their return to their homeland in the foreseeable future. Nine years into the crisis, Bangladesh remains largely alone in confronting a problem it did not create and cannot resolve on its own.

Shudeepto Ariquzzaman is a research fellow at Neeti Gobeshona.

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