A roadmap to amending the National Human Rights Commission Act 2009

The National Human Rights Commission Act 2009 was enacted to establish an independent National Human Rights Commission for the protection, promotion, and effective enforcement of human rights in Bangladesh in accordance with its constitutional and international obligations. However, critics have noted that the Commission has severe institutional and legislative limitations. In this write-up, I will discuss those.

First, the legislative framework restricts operational independence and the enforcement capacity of the commission. It is important to note that Article 28 of the Constitution establishes a fundamental mandate to eliminate all forms of discrimination in the state and public life. Similarly, Article 2(1) of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 requires state parties to respect universally recognised human rights without any distinction as to race, color, sex, language or religion. However, the National Human Rights Commission Act 2009 severely undermines these broad international entitlements. Section 2(f) of the Act narrowly restricts the definition of human rights to civil and political rights declared under international instruments already ratified by Bangladesh and currently enforceable by domestic laws. As a result, the current statutory framework ultimately forces the national human rights commission to operate within a highly restrictive legal domain, rendering it structurally incapable of addressing broader universal protections.

Second, legislative exemptions further erode adjudicative competence of the commission, systematically shielding state actors from the independent accountability. Ssection 12(2) of the 2009 Act explicitly prohibits the commission from investigating matters related to their employment of public servants and statutory authority employees who fall under the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunals Act. This persistent segregation of public authorities from independent investigation creates a structural barrier which prevents the commission from honouring binding multilateral treaties. The domestic commission remains legally unequipped to proactively investigate and prosecute these state-sanctioned abuses in employment-related matters. Furthermore, the government retains total discretion to ignore the commission’s recommendations because the institution lacks binding enforcement authority.

Furthermore, statutory flaws in the appointment process critically hinder the operational effectiveness of the commission. Section 6(2) of the 2009 Act allows the government to appoint a Chairman and members who lack specific legal expertise in the human rights jurisprudence. This absence of mandatory legal acumen in human rights jurisprudence specifically, directly limits the ability of office bearers to perform their duties effectively. The High Court Division formally recognised the systemic failure of the Commission in the prominent case of Children’s Charity Foundation Bangladesh v NHRC (2019), observing that the commission regularly fails to protect victims of human rights violations, labeling its ongoing negligence as frustrating.

Comparing this framework to regional counterparts exposes the severe deficiency of the Bangladesh model. Section 3(2) of India’s Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 strictly requires that the Chairman and two members be former Chief Justices or Judges of the Supreme Court or High Courts. India also provides for specific Human Rights Courts under section 30 to ensure speedy trial of contraventions. Elevating the institutions by mandating judicial backgrounds for the leadership positions profoundly enhance adjudicative competence and independence of the domestic human rights apparatus.

Finally, financial dependence and weak institutional status constitute barriers to our commission’s independent functioning. Section 24(4) of the 2009 Act makes the commission directly reliant on government and local authority grants for its operational budget. This financial subservience violates core tenets of the Paris Principles, approved by the General Assembly Resolution 48/134 in 1993, which explicitly advocate for adequately funded, independent national human rights institutions. Regional models demonstrate how legal elevation solves these structural vulnerabilities. Article 248 of the Constitution of Nepal 2015 establishes its commission as a formal Constitutional body, while Article 249(3)(d) empowers it to order direct compensation for victims of infringements. Section 184 of the Constitution of South Africa 1996 similarly guarantees its commission as a Constitutional body with definitive power to take steps ensuring appropriate redress, while its 2013 Act allows it to directly oversee government departments. Comprehensive legislative amendments must urgently eradicate financial dependencies and subjective appointment criteria restricting the national human rights commission in Bangladesh. Only an independent and effective human rights commission can adequately deter the various forms of human rights violations in the country.

The writer is Advocate, Appellate Division, Supreme Court of Bangladesh, and Dean, School of Law, Eastern University.